It is a great pleasure for me to attend this conference. The turn of century is witnessing profound changes in international security situation. Against such backdrop, arms control and non-proliferation has come to an important turning-point. Its future course is a common concern of the international community. This conference is both necessary and timely, for it offers us a good opportunity to look back and forward into the arms control and non-proliferation issues, and to explore new ways and new solutions. Here, I would like to express my appreciation for the vision and wisdom of the organizers of the conference, and for their enthusiasm and dedication to arms control and non-proliferation. I wish the conference a complete success.


The topic assigned to me was "what more can be done to secure enthusiastic Chinese participation in and defence of the regimes". To be frank, when I saw this topic, my first reaction was China has not done its public relations work properly, for even knowledgeable scholars like the organizers of this conference seem not to know much, or even have some misunderstandings, about China's policies and practices on non-proliferation.


Therefore, I feel compelled to give a brief introduction to China's policies and practices in this field. China firmly supports the international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, and has actively and enthusiastically participated in and defended all multilateral non-proliferation regimes based on international legal instruments. China acceded to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992 and contributed positively to its indefinite extension in 1995. China actively participated in the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), signed and ratified the convention in 1993 and 1997 respectively, and has implemented its legal obligations faithfully. China became a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984, and is now actively participating in the negotiations of a protocol to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. China was one of the first to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and has played a positive role in the work of the CTBTO Prepcom. As a member state of IAEA, China has put its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards on a voluntary basis. It joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997, and signed the "93+2" protocol aimed at strengthening the IAEA safeguards system by the end of 1998. Moreover, China has signed and ratified relevant protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. It has also undertaken to sign the amended protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.


These facts indicate that China has joined almost all the multilateral legal instruments in the field of arms control and non-proliferation. Apart from participating in multilateral non-proliferation efforts, China has improved its export control systems on sensitive items and technologies, and has promulgated a series of laws and regulations. In December 1995, China published the Regulations on the Supervision and Control of Chemicals, and subsequently issued the List of Chemicals Subject to Supervision and Control and the Bylaws for the Implementation of the Regulations in June 1996. China promulgated the Regulations on Nuclear Export Control in September 1997, and the Regulations on the Control of Military Products Export in October 1997. In June 1998, China published the Regulations on the Control of the Export of Dual-Use Nuclear Materials and Related Technology. All these facts have shown that China adopts a clear-cut policy against the proliferation of WMDs. This policy will remain unchanged in the future.


Looking back, one of the basic reasons that prompted China to adopt its non-proliferation policy was the relaxation of the international situation and the improvement of the relations between major powers after the Cold War. Under such circumstances, non-proliferation of WMDs is conducive to the global stability, and is in the interest of most of the countries in the world. As a matter of fact, this is also the fundamental reason behind the achievements attained in international arms control and non-proliferation in the post-Cold-War era.


However, recently, the international situation has been undergoing the most profound changes since the end of the Cold War. In a certain sense, these changes have marked the end of the post-Cold-War era, and the beginning of a new and more turbulent era. These changes are bound to have far-reaching impacts on the cause of international non-proliferation. Meanwhile, with the deepening of non-proliferation efforts, some negative tendencies have emerged in this field. How to assess such impacts and how to reduce and remove such negative tendencies? This is a question calling for serious consideration by all governments and people committed to arms control and non-proliferation. Whether the international community could reach a constructive consensus on this question and take necessary actions, is crucial for progress in arms control and non-proliferation in the next century. Here, I would like to share with you some of my personal views on this:


I. Interference in other countries' internal affairs and the use of force will jeopardize international security environment essential for progress in arms control and non-proliferation.


As is known to all, arms control and non-proliferation does not exist in vacuum. Rather, it hinges upon a peaceful and secure international environment. History tells us that, absence of security constitutes a primary incentive for a country to acquire and develop WMDs. Indeed, arms control and non-proliferation will go nowhere in a world where everyone feels insecure. This year's NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in blatant violation of the principles enshrined in the UN Charter has delivered a hard blow to international arms control and non-proliferation efforts. It has highlighted the role of military power in safeguarding national security, compelling countries to review their international security environment, and increasing their urgency to build up their military force. While expressing their indignation on NATO's invasion, many people could ask this question: if Milosevic had nuclear weapons in his hand, would NATO dare to do what it did in Yugoslavia?


Furthermore, the war in Kosovo also reveals the hypocritical nature of some countries' non-proliferation policy. After witnessing the terrific performance of various kinds of sophisticated cruise missiles and smart bombs in Yugoslavia, few people would believe that the missile non-proliferation policy hard-pushed by some countries is aimed at safeguarding international peace and security rather than preserving their own military superiority.


II. Substituting international cooperation with unilateralism will hamper the process of arms control and non-proliferation.


Non-proliferation of WMDs relies on the joint efforts by the international community. Non-proliferation can succeed only in the framework of cooperative security. No country, no matter how strong it is, can ensure the success of non-proliferation single-handedly or only with the help of a few allies. It has to have the cooperation of other countries, especially those militarily significant countries. Unilateralism and non-proliferation are fundamentally incompatible with each other. As a matter of fact, all the existing non-proliferation treaties and regimes are products of international cooperation rather than achievements of any individual state. Obviously, international cooperation in the field of non-proliferation is in the common interest of all countries. We, therefore, should treasure and maintain such cooperation.


However, some country, out of its own ambition for global dominance, deliberately puts such cooperation in jeopardy. It willfully interferes in others' internal affairs, expands and strengthens its military alliances, and adopts a policy of containment towards countries which it perceives as its "rivals" or "potential rivals". All this is aimed at preventing the rise of other powers, so as to preserve its status as the only superpower. At the same time, it takes advantage of its economic and scientific strength to develop national missile defence system, in an attempt to disrupt the global strategic balance, and to seek absolute security and hegemony for itself.


As is known to all, during the Cold War years, the ABM treaty constituted a cornerstone of global strategic stability, paving the way for the limitation and reduction of offensive strategic weapons between the US and the former Soviet Union. Despite the drastic changes in the international situation following the end of the Cold War, the crucial role of the ABM treaty to the international security remains unchanged. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, any substantive amendment to this treaty will undermine global strategic stability.


It is true that what the ABM treaty maintains is "the balance of terror" and can only offer only relative security-not an ideal situation. However, given the strong proclivity of a superpower for the use of force, "the balance of terror" is certainly better than "the terror of imbalance", and relative security is better than absolute insecurity. Therefore, any violation of this treaty is bound to give rise to strong opposition from other countries, and will inevitably have severe negative impacts on international cooperation in arms control and non-proliferation. It may even result in a new round of arms race and more extensive proliferation of WMDs. This is in nobody's interest.


III. Double standards will weaken the impartiality and integrity of the international non-proliferation efforts.


The purpose of non-proliferation is to enhance the universal security of all countries. Only in such a way can non-proliferation efforts enjoy lasting viability. And non-proliferation should not become a tool for some countries to seek or maintain strategic and security advantages. On the issue of non-proliferation, as on other issues, all countries should be treated equally, while double standards and selfish criteria should be abandoned. Otherwise, non-proliferation efforts will lose the understanding and support of the international community. Some countries, however, formulate their non-proliferation policies entirely out of their own interests. When their friends and allies, or countries in which they have a major strategic and economic interest develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, they either look the other way or adopt a policy of tacit consent or even connivance. As for those countries not to their liking or countries of different culture, custom or ideology, they never hesitate to impose economic sanctions or even take military actions even on most dubious grounds. This reflects the short-sightedness of these countries and their lack of a long-term strategy on the issue of non-proliferation, which they themselves advocate so vehemently. As a result, not only the international non-proliferation efforts will be harmed, the self-interests of these countries will ultimately be jeopardized as well.


IV. Concerning the implementation of treaty obligations, an attitude of leniency on oneself and stringency on others cannot but undermine the authority of international treaties of arms control and non-proliferation.


Everyone is equal before the law. And treaty obligations should be honored. These are some basic principles underlying a civilized world. Yet, some country takes a cynical view on arms control and non-proliferation treaties and their legal obligations undertaken therein. This is extremely disturbing. When a treaty was under negotiation, they pushed for a strict verification regime and quick conclusion of the treaty. After the treaty was concluded, it always keeps a vigilant eye on others to make sure that other countries comply with the treaty. When it comes to itself, it would delay or even reject the ratification of the same treaties. Even if it ratifies a treaty, it would pass certain domestic legislation, the content of which is tantamount to reservations on key articles of the treaty, in clear violation of treaty provisions. This inevitably casts doubts on its sincerity towards arms control and non-proliferation treaties and their negotiations. These acts seem to tell the world that, as a self-styled world leader, it is making law for others, which itself does not intend to abide by. Obviously this is something that is unacceptable for any country with any sense of national dignity. The international community does not need a self-styled leader like this, much less do we need a world police. Or even if we did, we should not allow him to be above the law. We have a saying in China: do not do unto others what you would not want others do to you. He who wants to lead the world should behave himself well first.


V. Contempt for and mistrust of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation treaties is detrimental to the authority and universality of non-proliferation regimes.


International arms control and non-proliferation treaties are multilaterally negotiated and reflect the common will of the international community. They constitute the legal basis of international non-proliferation efforts, therefore, should be the guiding principles for all its states parties. Every state party is obliged to preserve the authority of these treaties, which is in their own interest. However, some countries on the one hand spare no efforts in pushing for the conclusion of such treaties, and on the other hand demonstrate an attitude of contempt of, and mistrust for, the treaties' role in preventing the proliferation of WMDs.


This attitude is shown in two ways: first, these countries, when they have the suspicion that another country might be in violation of a treaty, instead of seeking clarification or inspection through the procedures set forth in the treaty, they always attempt to resolve the issue through mass media or by exerting pressure bilaterally. Secondly, after the treaty enters into force, they still keep the export control arrangements at variance with the treaty provisions. During the negotiations of some arms control treaties, such as the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, they even go so far as to refuse any discussion on the issue of export control, for fear that that would further erode the raison d'etre of a certain existing export control group.


The apparent reason for these countries doing this is, as they claimed, that the arms control and non-proliferation treaties are not effective in preventing the proliferation of WMDs. After succeeding in incorporating various obligations into the treaties, including very intrusive verification arrangements, they now claim that these treaties can not be truly effective. This logic is beyond our comprehension. Of course, the lack of efficiency may not be the real reason. There may be some other deeper considerations which are only known to themselves. But whatever the reasons are, this approach can only end up undermining the authority of the international arms control and non-proliferation treaties, depriving international non-proliferation efforts of a uniform criterion, and casting doubts over the significance and even necessity of negotiating new treaties.


VI. Emphasizing non-proliferation while neglecting peaceful uses will lose the support of the large number of developing countries for international non-proliferation efforts.


Non-proliferation of WMD and international cooperation in peaceful uses of technology are two sides of a coin. They complement rather than conflict with each other. Experience has shown that every major step forward in non-proliferation is closely linked to enhanced international cooperation in related science and technology. It is precisely on the basis of such an understanding that almost every arms control and non-proliferation treaty contains provisions on the international scientific and technological cooperation and exchanges.


Unfortunately, some Western countries while pursuing very vigorously on non-proliferation, take a very negative attitude towards international scientific and technological cooperation. During the negotiations of treaties, they always try to avoid undertaking obligations on technological cooperation or to weaken the relevant articles as much as they can. After the treaty takes effect, their performance in implementing these articles is evasive at best. Moreover, certain countries use non-proliferation as an excuse to block legitimate scientific and technological cooperation between other countries, and even resort to economic sanctions. If such practice is allowed to continue, international non-proliferation efforts will lose the support of the large number of developing countries, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the non-proliferation regimes.


In conclusion, let me emphasize that non-proliferation of WMDs is a long-term undertaking. With the rapid advancement of science and technology, the increasing globalization of world's economy and the quick expansion of Internet, it will be more and more difficult to achieve non-proliferation objectives. The fundamental way to prevent the proliferation of WMDs lies in the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of such weapons. Pending the attainment of this ultimate objective, it is necessary for the international community to take measures from two perspectives. First, efforts should be made to improve the international security environment, and to establish a fair and just new international political and economic order. Only in such a way can each and every country, large or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, with or without WMDs, enjoy a sense of security, thereby removing the incentives for countries to acquire and develop WMDs. Secondly, efforts should be made to enhance international cooperation in the area of non-proliferation, and to explore new solutions consistent with the new international situation on the basis of existing non-proliferation treaties. The success of non-proliferation does not hinge upon the containment and pressure policy of a few countries, but on the concerted efforts of the whole international community.


In about two weeks time, mankind will enter a new century and a new millennium. It is our sincere hope that all countries will take concrete steps to reduce and remove those negative elements that hamper progress in our fight against the proliferation of WMDs and put the international non-proliferation efforts on a healthy track. This will be in the interest of all countries.


Thank you.

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