Proposals for inclusion in the Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons working paper submitted by China

1999-01-21 00:00

The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion into the recommendation section of the report of the third, session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference:


Ⅰ.Implementation of the Provisions of NPT Relating to Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances


1. To promote the smooth development of the disarmament process and safeguard world peace and security, all States Parties commit themselves to cultivate a new security concept in line with the need of the times. The core of such concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.


2. To ensure real progress in nuclear disarmament and reach the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world as early as possible, all States parties should strive to establish a just and fair new international political and economic order, renounce cold war mentality, firmly oppose and do away with hegemonism, power politics and the pursuit of absolute military superiority. All States Parties reaffirm to respect one anther's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international relations, oppose the use or threat of military force against other countries under any pretext, and never resort to military force in the international relations without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council.


3. To promote the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, it is imperative to adhere to the principle of maintaining global strategic stability and the principle of undiminished security for every country, as well as ensuring an international environment of peace, security, stability and trust favorable for the continued progress in nuclear disarmament.


4. All States Parties should refrain from engaging in the research or development of missile defense system, which could upset global and regional strategic stability and balance or trigger off a new round of arms race. All States Parties should also refrain from transferring missile defense technology and equipment to other countries, so as to prevent the proliferation of missile and missile technology that could deliver weapons of mass destruction. No State Party should use missile defense program to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, impair their sovereignty or threaten their security.


5. The prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are mutually complimentary and promotive. The thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is the objective, and the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation one of the effective means and necessary steps to attain this goal. In order to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons so as to free the mankind forever from the threat of nuclear war, --the relevant nuclear weapon States should renounce the nuclear deterrence policy characterized by" the first use of nuclear weapons";


--the U.S.A and the Russian Federation, bearing special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, should continue to cut down drastically their respective nuclear arsenals;


--all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil should be withdrawn to their owner's territory;


--all the nuclear weapon States should, as soon as possible, undertake unconditionally and in a legally-binding manner not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. International legal instruments should be concluded to this effect;


--all States Parties and the whole international community should push for the early entry into force of CTBT in accordance with its provisions, the negotiation and conclusion of a universal and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty as soon as possible, and on the basis of the above-mentioned measures, negotiations to conclude a convention completely banning all the nuclear weapons.


Ⅱ.Implementation of the Provisions of NPT Relating to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Safeguards and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones


Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


1. In order to achieve the objective set out in NPT for preventing nuclear weapon proliferation, States parties should work for the building-up of a just and fair new international political and economic order, and strive to do away with hegemonism, power politics and the nuclear deterrence strategy characterized by "the first use of nuclear weapons"' In this way, all countries would feel secure, thus removing the fundamental incentives to acquire, develop or retain nuclear weapons.


2.To achieve the NPT's objective of nuclear weapon non-proliferation, the practice of double standards or multi-standards must be opposed, bloc export control arrangements should be replaced by nondiscriminatory and universally negotiated multilateral treaties.


Safeguards


All States parties should support the IAEA program for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, conclude agreement with IAEA on the application of the model protocol and implement these agreements as soon as possible. IAEA should promote its work in safeguards and in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a balanced way.


Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones


1. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary consultations and arrangements freely arrived at is conducive to the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation and contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations, including the legal obligation towards the nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the unconditional obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.


2.States parties to a nuclear-free-zone, if they are States parties to other international or regional agreements at the same time, should ensure that their observance of other international or regional agreements do not contradict their obligations to the treaty establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone.


3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones should constitute a geographical entity whose boundaries are to be clearly defined by the prospective States parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty through full consultations with other States concerned, especially in cases where territories in dispute are involved, with a view to facilitating agreement of the other States concerned.


Ⅲ.Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty


1. To negotiate and conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) will be conducive to promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.


2. Only mutually coordinated and jointly implemented with other nuclear disarmament measures, will FMCT be meaningful for achieving the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.


3. The commencement, progress and conclusion of FMCT negotiations are closely related to the development of international peace and security. With a view to early negotiation and conclusion of FMCT and promoting the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, all the States parties to NPT should:


--strive to establish a just and fair new international political and economic order, firmly oppose and do away with hegemonism, power politics and the pursuit of absolute military superiority in international relations;


--respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international relations, oppose the use or threat of military force against other countries under any pretext, and never resort to military force in international relations without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council;


--refrain from engaging in the research, development and deployment of space weapon systems and missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and stability;


--call upon the relevant nuclear weapon States to renounce the nuclear deterrence policy characterized by "first use of nuclear weapons", and withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil to their owner's territory;


--request all the nuclear weapon States unconditionally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. International legal instruments should be concluded to this effect.


In line with the above-mentioned measures, the Conference on Disarmament should commence negotiations in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon report, with a view to concluding a universal and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.


5. FMCT should only prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. The production of fissile material for other military or civilian uses should not be prohibited.


6. The verification measures of FMCT should be determined in accordance with the scope of the treaty as set out by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, rather than copying the verification models of other treaties conventions.


7. The future FMCT requires universality, with all the nuclear-capable States joining in the treaty.


Ⅳ.Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy


1. The practical enhancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will contribute to full implementation of all objectives of NPT, and play a significant promotive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Relevant work in this regard is an important part towards full implementation of NPT, and should be concretely undertaken.


2. In the fulfillment of the obligations of NPT regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the tendency to restrict or even to impede the right of the developing countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the pretext of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation should be opposed and terminated.


3. A few countries have established export control regimes which are beyond NPT and discriminatory and exclusive in nature. Under various pretexts, they adopt double standards and impede the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the relevant international cooperation by the States Parties to NPT, especially the developing countries. Such acts should he opposed, because it will undermine the basis for the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation. The bloc-oriented export control regimes should be replaced by globally universal non-proliferation regimes established through multilateral negotiations.


4. It is imperative for IAEA to strengthen its work in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA should not over-emphasize the safeguards function at the expense of its work to promote international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.