Mr. President,
First of all, I
wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, our
sincere congratulations to you upon your election as the
President of this Conference. I am confident that with your
wisdom, talent and rich diplomatic experience, you will lead
the conference to a success. I would like to assure you of
my delegation's full support and cooperation in your work. I
would also like to take this opportunity to express my
gratitude to Amb. Pasi Patokallio of Finland, Amb. Tadeusz
Strulak of Poland and Amb. Camilo Reyes Rodriguez of
Colombia, Chairmen of the past three sessions of the
Preparatory Committee, for the valuable work they have
done.
Mr.
President,
At the beginning of the new
millennium, while hopeful for the future, we are deeply
aware of the heavy responsibilities on our shoulders. In the
course of the development of human history, the advancement
of science and technology and the spread of knowledge have
led us out of ignorance and backwardness and have brought
about civilization and progress. However, on its road
towards the prosperity and happiness, mankind has suffered
repeated scourges of war. The two world wars in the
twentieth century left mankind with memories of blood and
tears. Later on, the confrontation between the eastern and
western blocs caused people to live under the shadow of
danger of the war during the Cold War period which lasted
for more than forty years. With such bitter experience,
people all the more long for peace and stability. The
achievement of lasting peace and sustainable development
have become the common desire of the people of the
world.
After the end of Cold War, there
was, for a period of time, some relaxation of tension in the
international situation. But peace has not been achieved in
the world. Recently, there has been an increase of unstable
and uncertain elements in the international security. The
world is undergoing the most profound and complicated
changes since the end of Cold War.
It
should be noted that even though the Cold War has come to an
end, yet the Cold War mentality still lingers on. Military
alliances have been strengthened, hegemonism and power
politics manifest themselves from time to time, and a small
group of countries advocate the so-called "humanitarian
intervention", by which, they violate state
sovereignty. They went so far as to use force against a
sovereign state, bypassing the United Nations. Such acts not
only seriously undermined the world peace and stability and
grossly trampled upon the international law and the norms
governing international relations, but also caused
unprecedented challenge to the collective security system
with UN at its core, formed after the two world wars.
In order to enhance its strategic
superiority and establish its own absolute security, a
certain country has stepped up the development, deployment
and proliferation of its advanced ballistic missile defense
system, thus posing a severe threat to the global strategic
balance and stability.
In some regions,
forces of ethnic separatism and religious extremism are on
the rise, which not only jeopardizes the regional peace, but
also adds new elements of instability to the international
security.
These developments not only
cause the increase of military factors in the international
relations and a decline in the sense of security among
countries, but also seriously undermine the trust and
cooperation in the field of international arms control. The
positive momentum which emerged in the field of arms control
and non-proliferation after the end of the Cold War has been
seriously setback, and the international non-proliferation
regime has suffered repeated and heavy blows. The prospect
of the disarmament process is a cause for great
concern.
So, it is against this
background that the current Review Conference is taking
place. It is a very important conference, the outcome of
which will have a direct impact on the future and fate of
the international non-proliferation regime and the nuclear
disarmament process. It is therefore the responsibility of
all State Parties gathered here to ensure the success of
this Conference. The aim of a review conference should be to
take stock of the past and plan for the future. Now, in
light of the current international situation in arms control
and disarmament, I would like to elaborate the positions of
the Chinese Delegation on the three objectives of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely,
nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
Mr.
President,
Just as the Treaty's name
suggests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is
naturally one of the major goals of the NPT. In 1995, we
agreed on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which
represents a significant milestone in the prevention of
nuclear weapons proliferation, promotion of nuclear
disarmament process and realization of a nuclear-weapon-free
world. However, it is regrettable that, only three years
later, the nuclear explosions, first in Rajasthan and then
in Baluchistan cast a dark shadow over the future of the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
international community responded strongly. UN Security
Council Resolution 1172 established the correct principle
and direction for the solution to the nuclear issue in South
Asia. It is regrettable, however, that little substantive
progress has registered and Resolution 1172 has yet to be
implemented.
We have taken note of the
fact that the two countries in South Asia declared that they
would conduct "no more new nuclear tests" or
"would not be the first to conduct new nuclear
tests" and "would not impede the entry-into-force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)".
We urge the two countries to honour their commitments. At
the same time, it should be stressed that Resolution 1172
reflects the common will of the international community on
the South Asia nuclear issue, therefore the authority and
integrity of the Resolution must be safeguarded. The two
countries should fully implement the resolution at an early
date.
As a State Party to the NPT, China
has all along taken a serious and responsible attitude
towards nuclear non-proliferation. China is firmly opposed
to any form of proliferation of nuclear weapons to any other
country. China adheres to the policy of not advocating,
encouraging or engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation. We
do not help any other country develop nuclear weapons, nor
provide assistance to any nuclear facilities outside IAEA
safeguards. China has abided by the three principles of
nuclear exports, i.e., the export is used solely for
peaceful purposes; it must be subjected to IAEA safeguards;
and the export should not be transferred to a third country
without China's permission. In order to strengthen and
improve the control mechanism for nuclear export, the
Chinese government respectively promulgated the Regulations
on the Control of Nuclear Export on September 10, 1997 and
the Regulation on the Control of Nuclear dual-Use Items and
Related Technologies Export promulgated on June 1, 1998.
Moreover, China joined the Zangger Committee, an
international nuclear export control system, in October
1997. China has also participated in the negotiations of the
"93+2" Protocol aimed at strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA
safeguards system. China signed the Additional Protocol to
the Agreement between China and the IAEA for the Application
of Safeguards in China on December 31,
1998.
Mr.
President,
With the advancement of
science and technology, the deepening of the globalization
process and the advent of the information age, there will be
more and more difficulties to prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation. Practice shows that it is impossible to
realize the goal of non-proliferation only by the
traditional means of blocking or suppression. How to
effectively prevent the nuclear weapons proliferation under
the new circumstance? This must be answered by the whole
international community. China is of the view that further
efforts should be made in the following three areas in order
to address the non-proliferation issue. Firstly,
establishing a global security environment of stability,
cooperation and mutual trust, which will be the basic
guarantee for the prevention of nuclear weapons
proliferation. It is known to all that an important reason
for some countries to allocate huge financial resources to
the development of weapons of mass destruction is the lack
of a sense of security and the need to seek an effective way
for self protection. The establishment of a favorable
international environment, the insistence on the peaceful
solution of international disputes and security for all the
members of the international community will help remove the
motives of some countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. Secondly, to abolish double or multi-standards
in the field of nuclear non-proliferation is the
prerequisite for the success of nuclear non-proliferation.
The purpose of nuclear non-proliferation should be the
enhancement of the security of all states. The
implementation of the NPT should be used as the sole
criterion. Non-proliferation must not just serve the
security interest of a small number of countries. Much less
should the likes or dislikes of a country be taken as a
criterion for judgement. Otherwise, the credibility of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime would be undermined and the
extensive support lost. Thirdly, in the framework of
collective security, the enhancement of international unity,
cooperation and common efforts is the only correct and
effective way to solve the problem of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Without the cooperation with
other countries, no country, no matter how strong it is, can
reach the goal of non-proliferation by only relying on its
own power and the power of its allies. Any trend or action
of unilateralism runs counter to the main tide of the
non-proliferation efforts.
Mr.
President,
The Nuclear-Weapon States
must faithfully implement their obligations for nuclear
disarmament. This is the necessary guarantee for the
maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime. The indefinite extension of the NPT unconditionally
agreed upon by the non-nuclear-weapon states by no means
endorses the indefinite right to own nuclear weapons by the
Nuclear-Weapon States.
The emergence and
development of nuclear weapons not only results from the
technological development, it owes even more to the
international security environment and the perception of
security by each country. Nuclear weapons came into being in
the latter part of World War II and were developed during
the Cold War period marked by the eastern and western blocs
confrontation and mistrust. The late 1980s and early 1990s
witnessed the end of the Cold War, the relaxation of tension
of the world and the improvement of relations among major
countries along with some significant progress made in the
international nuclear disarmament process. The US and Russia
(the former Soviet Union) concluded some treaties on nuclear
arms reduction such as the INF Treaty, START I and START II.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally
reached after many years of painstaking efforts by the
international community. Due to the changes in the
international security situation since 1990s, the
international nuclear disarmament process has once again
bogged down to a standstill. The bilateral nuclear
disarmament treaties between the US and Russia are sluggish
in their ratification and implementation and the US senate
even refused to ratify the CTBT.
It is
gratifying to see that the Duma of the Russian Federation
has finally ratified the START II treaty recently after
several years of twists and turns. We look forward to its
early implementation of this treaty and the initiation of
the START III negotiations. China is of the view that
nuclear disarmament should be a comprehensive and
irreversible process. If only reducing obsolete nuclear
weapons while enhancing nuclear capability, or reducing the
number of deployed nuclear weapons while putting the reduced
nuclear warheads into the so-called "inactive
reserve" that keeps to be maintained or even renewed,
ready for redeployment at anytime, such practice are by no
means genuine nuclear disarmament.
It
should be particularly stressed that global nuclear
disarmament can not be reached without the global strategic
balance. President Jiang Zemin pointed out at the Conference
on Disarmament in March last year that the so-called missile
defense programme "will inevitably exert an extensive
negative impact on international security and stability and
trigger off a new round of arms race in new areas, thereby
seriously obstructing or neutralizing international efforts
of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation".
President Jiang also urged the international community to
take necessary measures to preempt such dangerous
developments.
We have noticed that when
the Russian Federation ratified the START II, it declared
that if the United States undermines the 1972 ABM treaty,
that would prompt Moscow to withdraw from START II as well
as all the other arms control agreements. History shows
that, as the cornerstone of the global strategic balance and
stability, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty concluded
in 1972 has provided the necessary security framework for
the USA and Russia cut down their nuclear stockpiles and
played an indispensable and crucial role in assuring the
continuous progress in their bilateral nuclear disarmament
process. Relying on its overwhelmingly superior strength in
economy, science and technology, a certain military power,
notwithstanding its large nuclear arsenals with overkill
capability, is vigorously pursuing the development of
national missile defense (NMD) system in an attempt to seek
absolute security for itself. Regardless whether an absolute
security is achievable, such action is tantamount to nuclear
arms build-up, which will not only bring severe damage to
the integrity and vitality of the ABM treaty and the global
strategic balance and stability, but also seriously disrupt
the basis for the US-Russia bilateral nuclear reductions,
impede the international nuclear disarmament process, thus
shatter the prerequisite and basis for international nuclear
non-proliferation. Russia's ratification of START II and
CTBT has let in a light of hope for the nuclear disarmament
process and we hope that the countries concerned can seize
this opportunity and get back on the right track of arms
control and disarmament, a track has been proven feasible in
the decade after the end of Cold
War.
Mr.
President,
China's nuclear weapons are
solely for the purpose of self-defense. It has therefore
always practiced utmost restraint in its nuclear weapons
development. Starting from the first day it came into
possession of nuclear weapons, China has unconditionally
undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Also
without any condition, it has committed itself not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has never evaded
its responsibilities and obligations for nuclear disarmament
and has been advocating the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In all seriousness
and with responsibility, it participated in the CTBT
negotiations and was among the first to sign that Treaty.
The Chinese Government has formally submitted the Treaty to
the National People's Congress for examination and
ratification. In the meantime, it must be emphasized that
there are two basic prerequisites for China to participate
in any arms control negotiations, nuclear arms control in
particular, namely, these negotiations and ensuring the
treaties or agreements must not compromise the global
strategic balance and stability, nor undermine China's
national security interests. In defiance of the strong
opposition from the international community, a certain
country is bent on developing the NMD disruptive to the
global strategic stability. This and other profound changes
that have taken place recently in the international security
environment will inevitably affect China's arms control
policy.
The Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty (FMCT) should be conducive to the prevention of
nuclear weapons proliferation and the promotion of nuclear
disarmament. Based on this understanding, China supports the
conclusion of a FMCT through negotiations. However, China is
of the view that, at a time when a certain country is
determined to develop a missile defense system using the
outer space as its important base, the prevention of the
weaponization of outer space is a task even more urgent than
the FMCT negotiation. Therefore, the three major disarmament
issues of outer space, nuclear disarmament and FMCT should
at least be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
in Geneva in a reasonable and balanced manner. As a matter
of fact, whether CD can treat these three issues in a
balanced way has become a matter of principle rather than
only of procedure. At stake is whether each country's
legitimate security concerns can be equally addressed at the
CD, the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiation.
Disarmament should be conducive to the enhancement of all
countries' common security, never becoming a tool employed
by a few States to strengthen their military superiority and
weaken or restrict other countries.
At
present, nuclear transparency is quite a topic in the field
of arms control. China holds that, as an integral part of
the efforts for the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons, certain transparency
measures are necessary if warranted. However, under the
present circumstances, whether time and conditions are ripe
for taking these transparency measures and whether they can
enhance mutual trust as expected, are questions worth
pondering. Nuclear-Weapon States have differed a lot in
their nuclear strategies and arsenals, therefore it is
unreasonable to ask these countries to take the same
transparency measures at the same time. Furthermore, what
degree of transparency in the military field can a country
accept is directly related to its strategic security
environment. Today, a superpower which rampantly intervenes
in other countries' internal affairs and willfully resorts
to force, is continuously improving its overwhelming
first-strike nuclear capability. On the other hand, it also
spares no efforts in developing an advanced missile defense
system capable of neutralizing any counter-strike launched
by a small- or medium-sized Nuclear-Weapon State after
sustaining a nuclear first strike. Under such circumstances,
it is neither conducive to their own security nor in the
interest of global strategic balance and stability to ask
the small- or medium-sized nuclear countries to take
transparency measures.
We believe that
the most rational and feasible confidence-building measures
now are that Nuclear Weapon States unconditionally undertake
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Although the ban on the
first use of nuclear weapons can not substitute the concrete
nuclear disarmament measures, it will increase the mutual
trust among Nuclear Weapon States as well as between the
Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, reduce
the risk of nuclear war and help decrease discriminatory
nature inherent in the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime. As a result, the universality and
effectiveness of the regime will be enhanced, leading toward
the necessary conditions for the complete prohibition of
nuclear weapons.
Mr.
President,
Promoting the peaceful use of
nuclear energy is one of the three objectives of the NPT.
Nuclear power is a clean and highly efficient energy with
tremendous potentials. Nuclear technology has been widely
applied in many aspects of human life.
As a developing country with certain
capabilities in nuclear industry, China adheres to the
relevant provisions of the NPT and actively carries out
mutually beneficial international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China has signed agreements
of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy with
governments of sixteen countries including the Russian
Federation, France and others. China has also helped
developing countries in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear
medical science and the application of nuclear technologies.
In the multilateral field, China has
carried out fruitful cooperation and exchanges with the IAEA
in areas of nuclear power plant construction, nuclear
safety, management of nuclear wastes and the application of
nuclear technologies. In addition to making timely and full
payments to the Technical Assistance Fund (TCF) of the
Agency, China has also provided extra-budgetary resources.
From time to time, the scientific and technical personnel
from developing countries come to China for survey and
training. Upon request by the IAEA, China also dispatches
experts to provide technical services and give lectures to
transregional projects or international symposium. China has
actively participated in the cooperation of nuclear science
and technologies in Asia and the Pacific, making great
contributions to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear
technology in this region.
In order to
fully implement the obligations of promoting the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and the international cooperation as
set forth in the NPT, China advocates the further
strengthening of the technical assistance to the developing
countries, lifting various unreasonable limits regards
nuclear technology transfer to developing countries, and
actively supporting developing countries to develop and use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with a view to making
nuclear energy beneficial to whole
mankind.
Every country has the right to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear non-proliferation
and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are complementary to
each other. To strengthen the international cooperation in
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and expanding the
application of nuclear technology will not only promote a
country's economic development, improve its people's living
standard, but also help prevent nuclear weapon
proliferation. But if the desire and demand for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy from developing countries are
ignored, while the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
export control are over emphasized and normal peaceful uses
of nuclear energy among various countries are impeded under
the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation, it will not only
deviate from the original aims of the NPT but also bring
harm to the interests of the countries concerned. If this
happens, the nuclear non-proliferation regime will not last
for lack of support.
Certain States have
categorized the world according to their preferences. They
call some countries they dislike by a host of weird names,
such as "rogue states" and have grossly deprived
the latter of the right for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. These double-standard or multi-standard conducts are
extremely unfair and irresponsible. They will not help solve
the concerns for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but
only deepen the mistrust among countries, causing
disappointment and doubt about the present nuclear
non-proliferation regime on the part of various countries,
especially the developing countries.
Mr.
President,
NPT is the most important
international treaty on arms control and has the widest
representation. Now the international situation is
undergoing great changes and disarmament efforts are at a
critical crossroad. Under such circumstances, it is of great
importance to ensure the success of this Conference for the
benefit of reinforcing the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime, promoting the international
nuclear disarmament and enhancing world peace and stability.
It is China's sincere hope that a final document can be
produced by consensus at the end of the conference, which
will mark the success of the Conference. As for the final
document, it is not important whether it is one paper
divided into two parts of reviewing and forward-looking or
two separate papers. What is important is that the document
should give an accurate evaluation of the implementation of
the Treaty in the past five years and make practical
arrangements on what goals should be reached in the next
five years. It is the first review conference since the
indefinite extension in 1995 and we should cherish such a
historic opportunity, overcome various kinds of negative
elements and strive for a consensus on all major issues with
a prudent, responsible and flexible attitude, so as to
establish a good foundation for the future review and
implementation of the Treaty.
Mr.
President,
I would like to wrap up my
speech by quoting a paragraph from the statement of Chinese
Vice Premier Qian Qichen at the United Nations General
Assembly in 1994: "Since mankind has been able to make
nuclear weapons and tap nuclear energy for peaceful purpose
in the 20th century, we are confident that in the 21st
century they will certainly be able to completely ban and
destroy nuclear weapons and fully harness nuclear energy to
enhance their own welfare". It is not an inaccessible
goal. The key lies in whether there is enough political will
for each and every country to realize this goal. We have
entered the twenty-first century and it is up to us to
choose whether to live under the shadow of nuclear weapon
threat or in the sunlight of peace and happiness. May all
the peace and freedom-loving people in the world join hands
to strive for a nuclear-weapon-free
world!
Thank you, Mr. President.