A year ago,  Australia, United Kingdom and the United States of America proposed a system of nuclear submarine cooperation amongst themselves under the rubric of AUKUS.

The serious implications of this cooperation for the non-proliferation regime alarmed many countries all around the globe, including China. Consequently, China suggested that this tripartite submarine nuclear cooperation should be brought under the examination of IAEA and proposed that it should be discussed in its Board of Governors under an agenda item titled "Transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT". This proposal was accepted by consensus and has been renewed four times since, always by consensus.

So as agreed, on 15 September this year again, the IAEA Board of Governors took up the aforementioned item. As expected, the issues related to the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, particularly the grave risk it posed to the NPT regime and the consequences it would have on the functioning of IAEA itself, came under thorough and deep discussion of the Member States.

After the meeting, Chinese Ambassador and Permanent Representative to international organizations in Vienna, Wang Qun, spoke to Chinese and foreign journalists.

Wang Qun, after reiterating to the journalists that the discussions in the Board of Governors revealed as before grave concerns of the Member States regarding the implications of nuclear submarine cooperation under AUKUS, elaborated that there was a wide-spread feeling that this nuclear submarine cooperation involved the illegal transfer of nuclear weapon material. He further said that it was an outright act of nuclear proliferation and the three countries had from the very beginning tried to camouflage the nature of their nuclear proliferation act by confusing right and wrong and misleading the international community.

To shed further and more complete light on false claims of the three countries, the Chinese Ambassador enumerated seven major issues in the trilateral cooperation which were of concern to his country, and which were also shared by a vast number of Members States of IAEA.

Wang Qun, called these as seven deadly sins of proliferation and elaborated them as under: 

Firstly, the "original sin" whereby the three countries have done their utmost to disguise the illegal transfer of nuclear material from two NWSs to a NNWS under the pretext of “naval nuclear propulsion”. Wang Qun pointed out that no amount of misuse of nomenclature such as the "nuclear propulsion" can hide the fact that it is in essence an act of nuclear proliferation.

Secondly, the three countries have confused legitimate military activities within a country's sovereignty with acts of nuclear proliferation.

The trilateral submarine cooperation under AUKUS is the very first time in history that Nuclear-Weapon-States blatantly, directly and illegally transfer tons and tons of nuclear weapon materials to a Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State. It is not a simple matter of indigenous development by a sovereign state of nuclear material used in military vessels.  The two cases should not be mixed up.

Thirdly, the three countries have misled public opinion by claiming that “nuclear material would be sealed in the reactors” and “cannot be directly used in nuclear weapons”. In fact, what is at issue is the proliferation nature of the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation It is certainly not a question how the related nuclear material is disposed of. And the very essence of nuclear proliferation in the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation simply cannot be circumvented, nor the attendant nuclear safety, security and nuclear proliferation risks lowered.

Fourthly, the three countries, especially Australia, have failed their reporting obligations required under their CSA and relevant protocols. A year after the announced decision on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, Australia has hitherto failed to provide the required and obligatory substantive reports. This is a  breach of its safeguards obligations.

Fifthly, The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, is a bad precedent in nuclear proliferation and goes well beyond the existing safeguards system. As such, it must be discussed by all IAEA members to find a solution. All IAEA members must have the final say on this issue.

Sixthly, the three countries have undermined the non-proliferation functions and authority of the Agency by coercing the Secretariat to engage in activities prohibited by the Statute. The three countries have been engaged in political maneuvering aimed at coercing the Secretariat into proposing a safeguards approach that legitimizes and gives legal cover to their otherwise illegal nuclear submarine cooperation and push it through the Board by cynically relying on their voting advantage.

China supports the agency in strictly following the provisions of article II of the Statute by not allocating budgetary resources to any activities which further military purpose.

Seventhly, the three countries have all along refused to report to the Agency on the substantive progress of their nuclear submarine cooperation on the grounds that "no cooperation programme has been established". This has prevented the Director-General and the Secretariat from submitting substantive reports, as required, on the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation to the Board  and from effectively fulfilling their reporting obligations under the Statute.

In conclusion Wang Qun stated that, among many serious issues, these seven cardinal issues came out of the discussions of IAEA Member States that are most telling in regard to the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation. He maintained that  if the three countries were are allowed to "pretend" that they were fulfilling the required obligations concerning their nuclear submarine cooperation, take  the Secretariat hostage and turn it into a "Trojan horse" to "whitewash" their nuclear proliferation acts and legitimize their otherwise illegal  nuclear submarine cooperation, it would  seriously harm the common interests of the international community, including the Agency Secretariat and all its Member States.