Remarks by the H.E. Ambassador LI Song at the IAEA

 Board of Governors meeting under agenda item 8:

Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS

 and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT

Mr. Chair,

On the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, China has expressed its position on numerous occasions. The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation constitutes serious nuclear proliferation risks, brings negative impact to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, provokes arms race and impairs peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It has been widely questioned and opposed by the countries in the region and the international community. We urge the US, the UK and Australia to abandon their cold war mentality and zero-sum game, fulfill their international obligations in good faith and act in the interest of regional peace and stability.

The AUKUS submarine cooperation is now at a critical juncture. The AUKUS partners are to announce concrete plans of cooperation next week. The essence of the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is the transfer of tons of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium by the United States and the United Kingdom, which are nuclear-weapon states and also the depository states of the NPT, to Australia, their military ally and a non-nuclear-weapon state, out of geopolitical and strategic security considerations. Such an act is a textbook case of nuclear proliferation, runs against the object and purpose of the NPT and poses grave challenges to the existing IAEA safeguards system and the NPT regime, having numerous negative implications for the years to come.

The AUKUS partners claim that the impact of the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation on regional security, as well as its multiple effects relating to military capabilities, are beyond the IAEA mandate, therefore it should not be discussed within the Agency. This is groundless. The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is obviously not a cooperation of peaceful uses in a setting that “everything is fine and harms no one”. It has to be reviewed from the perspective of its negative impact on the international and regional security and a larger background of the effectiveness of the NPT regime. Whether the AUKUS partners like it or not, allow it or not, these elements of thoughts will linger in the minds of the NPT states parties and the IAEA Member States, and it is also a reality that the IAEA Secretariat cannot ignore.

In the context of the safeguards mandates of the IAEA, the transfer of large amount of weapon-grade HEU in the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is unprecedented. Whether it is at all possible and how to conduct safeguards on such activities will not only put the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT at stake, but will also touch upon the interest of all Member States of the IAEA. This is simply not an issue that can be settled through some regular safeguards arrangements between IAEA and the Member States or by way of existing practices. There are ample reasons to involve all the Member States in seeking an appropriate solution through intergovernmental discussions.

Historically, each and every important revision and improvement of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was carried out through the establishment of a special intergovernmental working mechanism, with broad participation of the IAEA Member States and consensus-based approach. There is less reason for an exception this time. I may add, by way of a question, all above-mentioned work in the past was initiated by the western countries, including US, UK and Australia. Why this time do they want to go for an exception by rejecting other Member States?

 In view of the complex and far-reaching implications of the AUKUS, ever since the three countries announced the creation of AUKUS, the Board of Governors and the General Conference of IAEA, at the suggestion of China, has, for seven consecutive times, included the AUKUS issue in the agenda and started the intergovernmental discussion process that keeps going in-depth. This reflects multilateralism and democratic spirit within the framework of IAEA. Should there be any problem with this?

 I must particularly emphasize that the AUKUS cooperation is not a simple question of black or white, still less a question of taking sides, but a complex issue that involves different interest, different concerns, different views and positions of different parties, which deserves constant attention of, and full discussion by, all the Member States. Speaking of taking sides, all of us should take the side of safeguarding the NPT regime, and make this as a starting point for further work down the road.

 In this process, all Member States have reason and right to fully express their thoughts, concerns, raise questions, contribute their professional wisdom and solutions, and engage in full discussions with other Member States that have concerns. Since last year, China has expressed its own views, comments and arguments a number of times within the framework of IAEA. China expressed these views and arguments out of its high responsibility for the authority, integrity and effectiveness of the NPT regime and the IAEA. We respect the right of other parties to express their views, have no intention to impose ours onto anybody, and objects to any country’s attempt of imposing theirs. Various parties can hold different views on some of the specific points expressed by China, but all those aspects, issues touched upon in China’s working papers cannot afford to be ignored. They need careful thinking and discussion among Member States, with a view to seek common grounds and consensus.

The attempt of the AUKUS partners to impose upon all the Member States a privately-concluded safeguards arrangement through separate consultations with the IAEA Secretariat is an attempt to slip thing through. This cannot be accepted by the broad Member States. On one hand, they advocate for “highest standards of preventing proliferation”, but on the other hand, they label the normal intergovernmental discussion as “politicization”, so as to refuse such multilateral discussion. Is this their “rule-based international order”? The IAEA and the broader multilateral non-proliferation regime do not welcome, and will not accept such a “rule” and “order”.

At this critical moment when AUKUS partners are about to announce their concrete plans on the submarine cooperation, it is all more necessary to continue to advance this open, transparent, inclusive, and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process. This reflects true multilateralism, and only true multilateralism can effectively preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime. China is ready to engage in candid and professional communications with all Member States of the Agency, including the AUKUS partners, in order to find an appropriate response collectively in relation to the AUKUS issue. Prior to the achievement of a consensus on this issue by the Member States of the IAEA, the AUKUS partners should not reach a safeguards arrangement with the Secretariat, nor should they proceed with their cooperation on the nuclear-powered submarine.

We believe that, in this process, the Director General and the Secretariat of the IAEA will be able to uphold the Agency’s non-proliferation mandate and authority and faithfully fulfill relevant legal obligations, in accordance with the Statute and the mandate given by Member States, by carrying out its work in an independent, impartial, transparent and professional manner, fully respecting and presenting the different positions, concerns and views of various Member States  in a balanced way, submitting relevant reports to the Member States for their consideration in a timely and objective manner, and playing its due role in assisting the Member States in keeping and promoting the intergovernmental discussion process.

We call upon the Member States of the IAEA to actively participate in the intergovernmental discussion process and contribute their wisdom and efforts to the maintenance of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. China also urges the AUKUS partners to respond to the concerns of the international community by fulfilling obligations of nuclear non-proliferation in good faith and engage in candid and transparent dialogue with the parties concerned on the basis of equality and mutual respect. I and my team are open to such dialogue.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.