Mr. Chair,

China has taken note of the Director General’s second report on AUKUS submitted to the Board. China is of the view that the agenda item proposed by the Secretariat has neither accurately reflected the core nature of nuclear proliferation of the AUKUS cooperation, nor has it described the common understanding of the Member States of the Agency on the AUKUS issue. Therefore, China has strong reservations on the wording of this agenda item, disassociates from it, and have already expressed this position clearly in its note (GOV/2023/21/Add.2) to the Secretariat before the current session. Having listened to the statements made today, I would like to share with colleagues the following observations accordingly:

Following the announcement of the AUKUS cooperation plan by the US, UK and Australia on 13 March and the DG’s statement on AUKUS published on the following day, China stated its position in a note to the Secretariat (INFCIRC/1080) on 20 March. The AUKUS cooperation is the first transfer of nuclear submarine propulsion reactors and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium from Nuclear Weapon States to a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. The Agency’s current safeguards system is not able to achieve effective monitoring for such cooperation. The AUKUS partners asserted that they would adhere to the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation. Australia has requested to apply article 14 of the CSA and started working on safeguards arrangements with the Secretariat, in order to coerce the Secretariat into allowing non-application of safeguards for AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation. This seriously undermines the authority of the Agency and its safeguards system.

The US, UK and Australia have no rights nor authority to make decisions, on the issue like safeguards on nuclear submarine cooperation, for all Member States of the Agency. AUKUS cooperation is a matter touching upon the authority, integrity and effectiveness of NPT, and the related safeguards involve complex political, legal and technical issues with considerable international controversy. I also need to point out that such safeguard arrangements also involves new areas and practices of IAEA safeguards. Therefore, it should be decided by all interested Member States through a transparent, open and inclusive intergovernmental discussion process, taking into account the historical practice of the Agency in strengthening the safeguards system. If the US, UK and Australia are serious about meeting their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, they should support the current intergovernmental discussion among IAEA Member States on safeguards issues related to AUKUS cooperation, rather than imposing any safeguard arrangement  between AUKUS partners and the Secretariat on all other Member States.

Based on the above-mentioned position, China once again requests that the item “the transfer of nuclear materials involved in AUKUS cooperation and their safeguards” be included in the agenda of this Board meeting. The wording of this agenda item precisely reveals the real nature of the AUKUS issue and shows that it is by no means a routine safeguards arrangement. The transfer of nuclear material and the NPT-related aspects of this cooperation constitute the fundamental differences between the AUKUS cooperation and the nuclear submarine programme of the other country. I would like to emphasize that this agenda item, proposed by China for 8 times, is not “a politically motivated agenda item”. It arises from a highly responsible attitude towards the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Agency's safeguards system. China's persistent promotion of the intergovernmental discussion process in the Agency is aimed at focusing on the complexity and controversial nature of the AUKUS issue and dealing with it properly on the basis of an open, transparent, fair and equitable dialogue. To falsely accuse other countries with different views of “politicizing the discussion” and to coerce every country to take sides on AUKUS, is in itself an act of politicization.

I noticed that during today's discussion, some Member States highlighted the importance of ensuring full participation of Member States in the discussion process on AUKUS. We understand that the discussion on AUKUS within the Board is just that process. China will share its views on AUKUS cooperation with all parties under agenda item 8. We welcome all parties to participate in the discussions under that agenda item, to express their views, to speak freely, to clarify issues and to narrow differences. This is what we need to do to uphold true multilateralism and the spirit of Vienna in practical terms. China also requests the opinions expressed by Member States, especially different views, under both agenda items on AUKUS, to be duly reflected in Chair’s summary.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.