Mr. Chair,

Since the beginning of this year, a large number of Member States of the IAEA have been participating, shaping and guiding the discussions in the Agency on the AUKUS issue, which have entered a new stage and taken on new features. 

First, the discussion process has become an established practice. Since March this year, during meetings of the Board, the General Conference, the seminar held by China, the 1st Preparatory Committee meeting for the 11th NPT Review Conference and its side events on AUKUS hosted respectively by Chinese and Russian think tanks as well as Australian Permanent Mission, parties extensively exchanged views on the nature of AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation and its far-reaching impact, the traditional and historical practice in development and improvement of the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards system, the application of Article 14, and the role of the Secretariat, as well as many other technical issues. 

Second, the views expressed in the discussion are even more diversified. More Member States, some of them for the first time, have joined the discussion and expressed their positions on the AUKUS issue, some of which are different from either those of China or those of the AUKUS partners. These views have also inspired us, and will contribute to relevant discussions in the next stage.

Mr. Chair, dear colleagues,

AUKUS has a serious impact on the security of the world and the Asia-Pacific region, and poses grave challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system. AUKUS marks the first time that Nuclear-Weapon States cooperate with a non-Nuclear-Weapon State in military alliance on nuclear-powered submarines, which involves unprecedented transfer of tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials, crossing the threshold of nuclear proliferation and posing a serious risk of nuclear proliferation. Such cooperation runs counter to the purpose and objectives of the NPT and is a typical act of double standard.

AUKUS obviously cannot be regarded as a routine safeguards programme, nor be simply defined as “Naval Nuclear Propulsion” (NNP) cooperation. Neither can it be compared to Member States’ indigenous research and development of nuclear submarines. Judging by the discussions so far this year, the application of Article 14 to the Brazilian NNP programme is not controversial. Most concerns are focused on the important challenge of transfer of large amounts of nuclear materials involved in AUKUS. This precisely shows that AUKUS cooperation cannot be regarded as a regular NNP programme and subject to existing safeguards arrangement. AUKUS-related safeguards arrangement involves complex political, security, non-proliferation, legal, and technical issues, which brings the Agency’s safeguards system to a new territory and involves new practices. Regarding the above-mentioned issues, there are sharp and profound differences of views and concerns among Member States. Given the fact that Member States are far from reaching a consensus, whether and how Article 14 can be applied to AUKUS shall not be interpreted and decided by the AUKUS partners and the Secretariat on their own.

In view of the complexity and sensitivity of AUKUS-related issues, any arrangement aimed at addressing or resolving them will create an important precedent and have a significant impact on the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards system and relevant safeguards practices. Whether and how such a precedent can be applied to other countries in the future will have a far-reaching impact on the authority, integrity and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and will also affect the authority and universality of the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards system. All these are major issues that must be taken seriously, considered deeply, and handled properly by Member States.

Mr. Chair, dear colleagues,

Each and every important improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards system has been achieved through consensus-based and Member-State-driven processes, with broad participation of Member States. The important tradition of inclusiveness and consensus ensures that the IAEA safeguards system keeps pace with the time, on the basis of general acceptance and support of Member States. Upholding this tradition is in the common interests of all Member States, including the AUKUS partners.

In the process of developing and improving the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards system, it is normal for Member States to have different views and concerns. We should give full attention and respect to these different views, and strive for consensus through arduous discussions, consultations and negotiations. This has been the case with the development of important documents such as the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement template (INFCIRC/153), the Additional Protocol (AP) and the Small Quantity Protocol (SQP). This is a stage where true multilateralism and true Vienna spirit cannot evade or bypass. AUKUS cooperation is a long-term process, and discussions around AUKUS issues will also be a long-term one. We believe that Member States have enough wisdom, patience and determination to properly respond to the AUKUS challenge through intergovernmental discussions.

Mr. Chair, dear colleagues,

With the current complex and ever-changing international situation, the Agency’s discussions on some sensitive issues will inevitably be affected. To maintain the Agency’s authority, its safeguards mandate and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is imperative for Member States to stay committed to multilateralism and the Vienna spirit, to the Agency’s tradition in developing and improving the safeguards system, and to resolving differences through dialogue and consultation on the basis of equality and mutual respect. China would like to emphasize again that relevant discussions, including discussions related to AUKUS, should not become political confrontations among Member States. Member States participating in discussions and expressing different views should not be labeled as politicization or “taking sides”.

The Chinese delegation will continue to actively promote the intergovernmental discussion process in a responsible and professional manner. In fact, discussion among Member States on issues related to AUKUS has already been institutionalized, which is natural and inevitable so as to go deeper into the discussion and properly handle the AUKUS issue. We look forward to Member States continuing in-depth communications on the AUKUS issue based on this year’s discussions. We also expect the AUKUS partners and the Secretariat to share developments of their consultations on AUKUS with other Member States in a timely manner.

In short, the Agency should uphold the principles of openness, transparency, and mutual respect, honour its historical responsibility, promote an open, inclusive, transparent, and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process in a solid manner, and properly respond to new practices and new challenges in the field of safeguards brought about by AUKUS. We once again urge Australia, the US and the UK to respond to the concerns of the international community with concrete action, and maintain candid and transparent communication with other Member States on the basis of equality and mutual respect. I, together with my team, am willing to continue to engage and cooperate with other Member States, including the AUKUS partners, in a responsible and professional manner.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.